Introduction
New Russia requires a new understanding. A recently published, co-authored book 'Is New Russia New?' provides fertile ground for a new round of discussions regarding the 'old' questions on Russia [Shkaratan, Yastrebov 2016] . Is new Russia new? What
Post-transition vs transformation
The transition-vs-transformation discourse (TTD) emerged after the 1980s, when some states initiated a transition towards a new world requiring new economic, social, and political systems. Cambridge University Press even started a new series of books devoted to the changes 'after 1985'. In most cases, the transition view on the economy was inspired by the successful catch-up of developing countries such as Singapore, Japan, South Korea, China. In Russia, TTD started after perestroika, the period of the early 1990s, when the old command-based economy was disrupted mainly for the sake of a transition to a market economy. In light of this, most researchers (primarily economists) started to call Russia a transition economy.
However, sociologists (and some economists inspired by Polaniyi's views) usually assess the functionality of the transitional view on the processes that happened after the 1980s skeptically, preferring a transformational approach to understand the economic and social changes in society. The most prominent followers of this approach are Stompka, Yadov, and Zaslavskaya. Each endeavored to show that post-communist countries were experiencing fundamental changes, which were hard to forecast and administrate. The Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Science published a series 'Russia Is Transforming' 1 , where researchers discussed the changes occurring in post-Soviet
54

V. Anikin
'resource curse' and Dutch disease ]. Again, Russia was thrown back from the transition to a fully fledged knowledge economy. Very soon these issues were reassessed as 'wrong transformations'; the transition theory was rebranded under the broader term 'modernization'. Successful examples of catch-up development of some countries -Singapore, South Korea, China and Japan -contributed a lot to strengthening the research agenda formulated via modernization discourse. Russia was considered a 'normal country' ] that required structural reforms to boost modernization of its socio-cultural institutions. A transition can be considered complete when the necessary qualitative changes (transformations) are manifest. In the course of this discourse, some authors considered the changes happening in Russia a 'protracted' transition; that is, a transition, which is stable in its incompleteness. differentiates the terms 'transformation' and 'transition'; in his opinion, in no context-social, economic, or political-does Russia demonstrate an 'involutionary transition'; that is, a transition 'without transformation'. In fact, the transition of any system is not possible without transformations. If we manifest a transition, it implies transformation, positive or negative, which exists a priori. Transition may be accompanied by the desired transformations of the system or there may be undesired changes, which should be reassessed and corrected by government intervention. In other words, once Burawoy found evidence for an involutionary transition in Russia, it would be better to speak of wrong transformations, rather than 'transition without transformation'.
In contrast to Burawoy's interpretations of 'involutionary transition', transformations can manifest 'without transition'. Listing the transformations that have failed to occur in Russia, Burawoy stresses the indicators of directed change which could be attributed to pivotal features of a new transition phase. He argues that Russia completed its first transformational phase before 1998, and afterwards switched to transition. However, we know that by 1998 Russia had overcome the main bifurcation point, after which renationalization was hardly possible as the main property rights were held by private parties and the basic elements of market infrastructure were established and brutally maintained to support the flourishing merchant capitalism, free trade and financial capital. These and other arguments made some researchers consider the period of 1990-1998, which Burawoy considered 'the first transformational phase', a phase of transition to a market economy ; an involutionary transition with 'wrong transformations'.
Broadly speaking, Russia has deviated from the qualitative transformations inherent in a competitive system ] within a late-or post-industrial context ]. In recent years, the deviation from the competitive system became very salient, and questionable 4 for two main reasons: 1) the strict budget constraints of the 1990s were softened due to growing economic prosperity and the budget surplus remained at a substantial level until the crisis of 2014-2016; 2) Russia started to face the challenges of growing international competition for the information economy [Castells, Kiseleva 2000] . The situation of the late 2000s was therefore completely different from the 1990s. The dramatic effects of the recent economic crisis of [2014] [2015] [2016] showed that Russia should learn how to develop in prosperous years. This is one the main headwinds of a protracted transition.
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The protracted transition is the double challenge for Russia. On the one hand, Russia needs to complete the transition to an innovation-based economy, which is expected to overcome the resource curse. The roots of this challenge deepened during the 1965 Soviet economic reform 5 which stalled in the late 1970-1980s when Russia sought to move from industrial to late industrial development [Anikin (2) 2013] . On the other hand, Russia needs to integrate into the world economy as a producer of information technologies to become internationally competitive in the post-industrial world .
In other words, the challenges of a protracted transition have become one of the key issues in the post-transition period. In light of this, a very important question is how Russia will move against this and other headwinds [Anikin (2) 2017] blowing against the transition towards a post-industrial society. The recent political and economic isolation of Russia, occurring shortly after the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, makes this question highly relevant and important.
The unique Russian way
In the course of the (post)transition to an informational age, one needs to understand whether a society is ready for such a move. What is the benchmark? Should we move towards the countries which successfully caught up, like China, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan, or towards the Western world, like Germany, Great Britain, the USA? In other words, the very practical dilemma about the direction of the transition -West or East -is very typical for Russia. However, the recent crisis of 2014-2016 shows that we should reassess this dilemma with a deeper understanding that 'the Russian way' is a harmony between individualism and statism. It is a way of 'Democratic Power', which is expected to provide a fair development and corresponding opportunities to meet the fundamental interests of various social groups [Anikin 2016 ].
As mentioned above, the European experience of forming nation states on the basis of liberal democracy, multiculturalism and market-based individualism are not applicable in Russia. Western institutions are not supported on a cultural level. Moreover, Russians are not likely to identify themselves with Europeans. During the recent crisis 2014-2016, caused by the political and economic isolation of Russia, this negative identity of Russians became even stronger. In 2015 -the worst year of the recent crisisabout three quarters of Russians considered Russia 'a unique civilization, that will never absorb the western way of living' 6 . The absolute majority of citizens of New Russia perceive their country in the sense of 'Power' (88% believe that state must favor the interests of the society over the interests of a particular individual), which smoothes out the ideological, political and cultural contradictions, that were cleaving Russian society during the first transitional phase 56 V. Anikin [Akhiezer 2001; Zubarevich 2010; Petukhov 2006; Petukhov 2008] . However, statist values do not mean that Russians support totalitarianism and deny human rights. The absolute majority (96%) of Russians believe that people should have a right to defend their opinion even if others think differently. About 89% of Russians think that people should have the right to actively defend their views via demonstrations; however, this struggle must not disrupt public order. Individualism is therefore harmonized with societal interests.
These settings can be met only under the democratic arrangements of society. In 2016, 63% of Russians believed that Russia 'should become a democratic state which protects human rights and freedom for self-expression'. The other 37% were confident that 'democracy will not take root in Russia'. The socio-cultural system of New Russia supports the democratic principal of 'power for society', and not vice versa [Zdravomyslov 2000, p. 25] . Thus, we see that the power-statist perception of Russia does not imply totalitarianism and Eastern despotism. Further, it contradicts them as it contains a cultural mechanism to balance the absolute power of the state with a principal of universal justice and meeting the interests of all the members of the society.
Though Russians negatively perceive the neoliberal institutions of the western societies, the beliefs of Russians in their civilizational uniqueness implies not only a response to the policy of Western countries, but mainly reflects the fundamental perception of the unique specificity of the development of their country. During the relatively peaceful periods of the relationships between Russia and Western countries (for example, 2006 and 2013) , the percentage of those who believed that Russia to be a unique civilization which will never adopt Western ways of living, was still very highabout 65%. In 1996 -the period of overall euphoria about the convergence between Russia and the West -58% of Russians said that 'Russia should follow the path of the developed countries of the West' [Gudkov 2004] .
The self-identification of the population of transitioning Russia, founded mostly in 'contrast with the West rather than with the East', has deep historical roots and going back at least three hundred years [Nureev, Latov 2011, p. 27] . The social perception of Russia as a unique civilization is therefore a stably reproduced socio-cultural phenomenon. This is a distinctive feature of the Russian national identity, which supports the civilization theory and contributes empirically to theoretical papers assuming the existence of 'the Russian civilization' as a reality per se [Leksin 2012 ], see also [Leksin 2017 ], [Shkaratan, Yastrebov 2016] .
It would be misleading to consider this feature of the Russian national identity an outcome of sociocultural rigidity and traditionalism. The demand for modernization among Russians is very high. According to Levada Centre [Public Opinion-2015 , the Great Power of Russia is associated with the 'well-being of the people' (64% in November, 2014 and November 2015) and the high 'economic and industrial potential of the country' (60% and 58%, respectively). The perception of Russia in the sense of civilizational uniqueness does not contradict the modernization agenda. Moreover, it constitutes a framework for the expectations of a successful transition in the future [Pliskevich 2016] .
The statist values coexist with 'we-identities' that merge Russians with European citizens and, therefore, determine the 'tunnel of opportunities' for socio-cultural integration with the Western world. In 2015, the main values of Russians remain converged with the main socio-cultural settings of the European civilization. According to the IS RAS data, 89% of Russians associate themselves with 'people of the same profession and occupation category' and a majority of Russians (69%) identity with the middle class, which is also 
A new agenda for path dependency
From this perspective, the main issue for the successful transition of New Russia to the informational age relates more to the 'power curse' (or, the crisis of power [Zdravomyslov 2000 ]), than to any sort of 'civilizational rut' [Ilyin 2017 ]. The power curse of New Russia is revealed in the separation of supreme power from the people. Frankly, Russians are somewhat reluctant to any signs of the absolutization of power, but very sensitive to any disconnection of power from society. This is not a civilizational rut. The power curse is very common for those political elites who tend to absolutize power and behave aggressively towards their citizens ]. The contemporary Syria might be a clear example of it. Viewed from a historical perspective, the power crisis happened in France in the late 18th century, led to the revolution and ruined the Empire and, primarily the supreme power. The alienation of power from the nation became a crucial historical counterpoint on the eve of the Russian revolution and, therefore, appeared as one of the main factors of the dissolution of the Russian Empire at the end of the 19th century [Tikhomirov 1905] . A similar alienation of supreme power from the nation was very typical for the late Soviet Union [Lapin 1994 ]. At the end of 1980s, a crisis in the relationships between political elites and society contributed enormously to the crisis of power and the fall of the Soviet Union [Zdravomyslov 1999] and to the greater emancipation of political relationships in the 1990s [Kachanov 1997, p. 5] .
Recent studies highlight the growing concerns [Srednij klass 2016] of Russians regarding how the political elites realize the main functions of the state. The corruption and bureaucratization of office-holders and the privatization of the supreme power by a few cliques considerably increase the growing alienation of power and the dissolution of the norms and values that legitimize the central role of state as the backbone of society [Anikin 2016 ]. The peoples of Russia who support absolute power on behalf of the development of the state, in fact, do not feel that the elites use this power to meet the fundamental interests of the Russian society in the face of the strong headwinds of marketization and capitalism.
The reality of New Russia is revealed in the overwhelming presence of the market and its inevitable consequences for the social stratification of Russian society [Tikhonova 2014 ]. The authors of 'Is New Russia New?' highlight that Russia obtained new patterns of social stratification, unknown in Russia before perestroika. These patterns relate not only to income stratification Moreover, the authors of 'Is New Russia New?' contributed to the study of the postindustrial forms of stratification, such as the precariat. It was shown that the precariat is formed of people with a lack of cultural and social capital. There is a growing number of cases when precarious status becomes an outcome of individual choices of those young Russians who value freedom and creative activities. Employment instability and nonstandard work become a tunnel of opportunities for creative workers. However, most of the working population suffer from employment instability (which coincides more with the 'classical' theory of the precariat . The majority of workers hold 'bad jobs' that do not require much human capital [Anikin (1) Over-education and slow rates of growth in human development 7 The quality of Russia's transition should be understood and reassessed through the lens of human development. This is one the key arguments of the book and particularly in David Lane's chapter [Lane 2016, pp. 53-75] . Although levels of gross national income recovered by 2010s in Russia (and other post-socialist countries), the large inequalities eliminated these effects, as the benefits of economic growth were not distributed among the mass population.
The social dimension of economic development -and focus on its 'comprehensive outcomes' -was conceptualized by Amartya Sen . Based on his ideas, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been drawing the attention of both academics and politicians to the issue of a human-oriented economy since 1991 ; at the center of such an economy should be placed the human being rather than abstract financial figures. To capture the achievements of various countries in the field of human development, the UNDP proposed the Human Development Index (HDI). Table 1 summarizes the HDI estimations for the last 25 years 8 . The average achievements in human development of catch-up countries vary from very high (Singapore, Honk-Kong, South Korea, Japan, and the Baltic states) and high (Brazil, China, Turkey, and Ukraine) to median (South Africa and India) and low (e.g. Nigeria, Afghanistan, Syrian Arab Republic, and the Central African Republic). Among BRICS and CIS, Russia's HDI rank is the highest; 49th place out of 188. In 2015 Russia was at the bottom of the list of the countries of 'very high human development'; although, in 2014 Russia shared its HDI rank with Belarus holding the highest rank among the countries of 'high human development'. In 2015, Brazil and China remained their positions in the human development group of countries of high HDI values (Brazil's rank is 79, China 90). Two other BRICS countries, South Africa (119th) and India (131th), remained in the human development group of 'medium' HDI values.
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In 2014 Russia passed some European countries such as Serbia (66th HDI rank) and Bulgaria (56th); in 2015 it surpassed Romania (50th), mainly because it downgraded the HDI rank. In 2014 Russia was nearing Kuwait (48th), a Persian Gulf country that traditionally invests a lot in the nation's human capital 10 . From 1990 to 2014/2015, Russia showed the best increase in HDI rank among industrially advanced societies; however, the rates of growth in human development in Russia were lower than in Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, and Kazakhstan (2015) . Taking into account the issue of over-education [Anikin (2) 2017] and the drop in real wages caused by the current economic turmoil in Russia, we document a slowdown of the rates of growth in human development, which might remain in the nearest future.
Russia did not use all the opportunities offered by its recent economic growth. Economic development in Russia was not oriented towards increasing the opportunities and economic prosperity of the mass population. Ultimately, the resource curse of Russia became more salient and inertial. This shows that the market alone is not an optimal mechanism for achieving the desired results in human development, or at least for reproducing the social welfare of state socialism [Lane 2016 ]. The cases of successful transitions of post-socialist countries (like Poland or Belorussia) reveal the exclusive role of the state. However, the Russian state failed to meet the goal of a balanced transition and escaped from its social obligations -with both trends getting worse over time.
Neoliberalism, exploitation, and social alienation
11
'Is New Russia New?' devotes a whole chapter to the issues of risk society, critically developed by social pessimists like Beck ] and Bauman ]. This chapter revives the issues of the neoliberalism of post-modernity reflected through three domains: 1) different forms of exclusion, particularly, the financial exclusion of a majority of the population from the main facilities and public goods; 2) the switch to non-standard employment ; and 3) state escapism from welfare responsibilities under the growing commodification of relationships and marketization.
The essence of neoliberalism is revealed in the transitioning of economic and social risks from organizations and institutions to individuals. The neoliberal regime is considered perhaps the most powerful headwind against Russia's transition to a postindustrial society. The Russian state is gradually decoupling from the social sphere. The monetization of social support and benefits, cutting unemployment benefits, resentment toward the decrease of living standards and increasing inequality, independent regulation of the labor market and high exploitation are just a few examples of the neoliberal course gradually being established in Russia. 10 In the Persian Gulf states, education is strongly associated with religion. This can affect the HDI ranks of the given countries, which should be taken into account in international comparisons. However, a contribution of religious education to HDI should not be exaggerated, as HDI includes also data on national income and health. These states reroute their rental incomes to social prosperity and development. According to the latest World Health Organization (WHO) data published in 2016, the average life expectancy at birth in Russia is 70,5 (107 th rank), which is remarkably lower than in Kuwait (74,7 years, 73 th rank) or Saudi Arabia (74,5 years, 77 th rank). 11 I have also published the main arguments for the following section in [Anikin (2) 2017].
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Russia is currently cutting spending on spheres strategically important to developing the intellectual economy and advanced human potential of the population. According to Table 2 , Russia has a very limited budget for education. During the period of economic growth, federal spending on education as a proportional of total expenditure was more than 5%. However, during the period of economic crisis, it decreased to 3,91% in 2015.
Notwithstanding the over-education trend in Russia, these figures are extremely low compared with those for industrially advanced economies like Germany, Great Britain, Norway, or the US. According to the Federal Treasury data, the educational expenditures of Russia includes pre-school spending, the relative share of which is extremely low, around 0,2% in 2015. However, these particular investments in pre-school development programs should be of a primary interest to industrially developed states ]. The expenditure on the health care system is the smallest among industrially developed countries. Despite additional transfers from the Health Insurance Fund, the spending on health care continued to decrease; it was 3,3% of total federal expenditure in 2015. Given that Russia has not yet performed the so-called epidemiological revolution , this figure unambiguously indicates 62 V. Anikin the lack of institutional investment in human beings and, consequently, explains lower rates of life expectancy and higher mortality rates from preindustrial diseases even in big cities. The Russian government has also suspended deductions for contributions to pensions and reduced the economic security of working people, as they are forced now to secure their old age using private funds. The total spending on social policy decreased from 29,93% in 2012 to 23,29% in 2014. Although, Russia slightly increased relative spending on pensions in 2015, its level is still below 2011.
The public discourse supported by the government remains neoliberal. In drafting the most recent budget, the Finance Ministry made efforts 'to optimize cost structures' (i.e. to cut budgets) by proposing not paying the base part of the retirement pensions to working pensioners. Strong public resistance meant the government refused to support this and other initiatives of the Finance Ministry.
Another remarkable indicator of state escapism is the high level of socioeconomic insecurity of Russian employees and its positive elasticity to economic shocks ( Table  3) . In 2104 only 56% of the working population said that their legal labor rights were followed. Between 2014 and 2015 there was a sharp decrease in this number to 47% in 2015 (i.e. a 16% relative change). Although the situation in this sphere slightly improved in 2016 -primarily regarding the key positions such as the prompt payment of salary and official employment -in 2017, the year of the post-crisis negative stabilization, their values had just returned to their starting points, if that. In most cases, legal labor rights are more likely to be abused in generic labor. The labor rights of professionals and managers were less affected during the crisis; however, their social benefits, provided before 2013, were reduced. According to Table 3 , the relative share of those received additional benefits shrank three times, from 15% in 2014 to 5% in 2016; although in 2017 they were partially recovered. Since the major recipients of these benefits are managers and skilled professionals, this may lead to the risk of demotivation and the alienation of the most qualified categories of the Russian working force.
Russia is not the only country facing risks of neoliberalism. There is a convergence of non-liberal states against neoliberalism. Most cases of successful catch-up development ('Asian Tigers') demonstrate alternative, directed market coordination, which could be
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Conclusion
Is New Russia new? In most respects, yes. Russia has never faced the challenge of a (post)transition to an information age; it has never experienced harmony between individualism and statist values; Russia has never faced the challenges of over-education and deskilling; Russian society has never had classes and such deep income stratification; and Russia has never lost so much because of neoliberal policies.
We cannot ignore the range of crucial transformations which Russia has experienced during the 30 years since perestroika. Some of these aspects (for example, the class system) are likely to become new institutional ruts for Russia. Different social groups are likely to stick to their specific paths (such as the exploitation for generic labor and continuing education for the middle class). Moreover, the neoliberal economic policy that leave people face to face with free market forces is likely to be a path that Russian elites, supposedly, will never give up.
Some of the 'civilizational ruts' need not be considered in dysfunctional terms. For example, I tend to believe that the 'neostatist' mode of the socio-cultural system plays a positive role in crises, supporting social coherence. The statist values of Russians can help to mobilize the resources of the population to promote modernization, that is, a successful transition towards the fully fledged knowledge economy. However, this socio-cultural model has the higher risks of the 'power curse', which has happened to Russia several times.
The Book 'Is New Russia New?' gives fertile ground for the further research into what is new wine and what are old skins. It concludes that Russia has accumulated a critical level of fundamental prerequisites for a 'great' civilizational shift which might happen under the pressure of the powerful civilizational diffusion that has taken place in Russia during the last 30 years.
В.А. Аникин
сложился средний класс, наблюдаются очертания низшего класса и андер-класса. Элементы этакратической системы стратификации наблюдаются лишь по отношению к тем редким слоям населения, которые имеют доступ к дефицитному властному капиталу, не затрагивая массовые слои населения. Отечественная социология по-прежнему испытывает дефицит исследований по проблематике рабочего класса. Отчасти этот пробел решен в рассматрива-емой монографии в главе, посвященной проблеме прекариата в современной России, ключевым фактором которой являются ограничения в накоплении со-циального и культурного капиталов. Прекаризация труда и его включение в зону родовой рабочей силы становятся новой ловушкой («колеей») перехода 2.0, сопровождающего страны на пути постиндустриального развития. 5. Авторы выявили, что формальные уровни образования уже не являются тем фактором, который способен решить проблему прекаризации. Несмотря на выводы авторов монографии, последние данные говорят о том, что Россия достигла более высоких показателей человеческого развития, чем в советское время. Однако цена этого достижения -избыточность высшего образования и его неизбежная девальвация. Более того, качество человеческого развития остается по-прежнему на низком уровне, прежде всего в связи с замедлением темпов роста доходов и крайне низкими показателями (для индустриально развитых стран) в области здравоохранения. Россия по-прежнему не преодо-лела эпидемиологический переход, что сказывается на высоких показателях смертности от внешних причин и инфекционных заболеваний. 6. Главным риском (и «колеей») новой России является кризисный характер властных отношений, проявляемый в отказе в отчуждении власти от народа. Кризис власти представляет собой наибольшую опасность именно в обще-ствах с этакратической моделью национального самосознания. Отчуждение верховной власти от народа в условиях, когда общество делегирует этой вла-сти полномочия по осуществлению модернизации и легитимирует примат макросоциальных интересов над индивидуальными, может порождать де-стабилизацию и раскол социетального целого. В России отчуждение власти от народа на протяжении 30 лет последовательно принимает форму неолибе-ральной политики, которая лишает население защиты от «невидимой руки рынка» и тем самым блокирует структурные реформы и перспективы России на успешный переход к постиндустриальному этапу развития.
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